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Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences
Introduction 
Freedom to Farm legislation enacted in 1996 was widely perceived as a dramatic step
toward a more market oriented farm policy which would create a producer decision environment
more conducive to competitive adjustments.  Enacted in a time of high market prices and large
exports of agricultural products, the transition payments were initially larger than deficiency
payments would have provided.  Generally, this legislation received strong support from
Midwestern and Central Plains states.  However, final passage was secured through concessions
to legislators from other regions.  
Abrupt declines in many farm program crop prices in 1998 have tested the support for
Freedom to Farm.  Aggregate net cash income excluding direct government program payments in
1999 is now projected to be $35.4 billion which is 31 percent below the record high of 1997.
These changes have brought about a severe test of the Freedom to Farm legislation.  This is
evidenced by the passage of ad hoc disaster legislation in both 1998 and 1999, after a three-year
cessation.  In 1999, USDA projects direct government payments to total $22.5 billion -- three
times the payment level of 1996, when Freedom to Farm was enacted. 
Thus, in 2000 there is widespread debate about the future direction of farm policy.  The
Secretary of Agriculture has repeatedly called for modifications of farm policy to provide a better
"safety net" for agricultural producers.  Some have gone as far as suggesting a repeal of the 1996
Farm Bill.  Further, substantial attention has been given to crop insurance reform during the past
year.  The President called for modifications of crop insurance in his State of the Union Address,
and a number of bills have been submitted in both Houses of Congress that would significantly3
modify current crop insurance programs.  These proposals generally provide enhanced benefits to
producers through increased subsidy percentages for buy-up insurance coverage and/or a higher
level of catastrophic coverage.  No legislation was ultimately enacted in 1999, but previously
budgeted funds will likely ensure continued efforts to find consensus legislation.    
As Congressional leaders and the administration continue to seek solutions to concerns 
expressed by producers and their representative organizations, they are often confronted by
divergent and even contradictory messages from various regions and producer groups.  Because
alternative policies have potentially dissimilar economic implications for producers, their 
preferences would logically be derived from an economic evaluation of the various alternatives. 
This research follows the vein of literature that has investigated producer policy preferences at
various points in the past.  Past agricultural policy surveys include Edeleman and Lasley;  Orazem,
Otto, and Edeleman; Barkley and Flinchbaugh; Kastens and Goodwin; and Zulaf, Guither, and
Henderson.
Scrimgeour and Passour related preferences for farm policy to the public choice literature
which assumes that self interest explains actions of individuals in the political process.  They go
on to argue that many factors beyond wealth maximization may enter into policy preferences. 
Given that many farm policy options under consideration today involve the provision of risk
protection, a natural extension of policy preference analysis consistent with Scrimgeour and
Passour, is to consider policy preferences in an expected utility framework. 
  This study explores producers’ preferences for current farm policy options and
investigates the economic factors underlying producer preferences.  It is useful to understand the
perceptions of producers and how they differ regarding to the possible alternatives for modifying4
current farm policy.  Because farm policy is often criticized for applying a one-size-fits-all
approach to a heterogenous population of producers, understanding the causal economic
relationships between policy preferences and determinants of the farm’s decision making context
provides useful insights into why producers differ in their policy preferences.  In particular, we
incorporate variables which characterize the risk perceived by the respondents and their level of
risk aversion.   
Survey Procedures
  A survey conducted in the spring of 1999 elicited producers’ preferences for various
farm policy changes.  This survey was conducted as part of a research project funded through a
USDA risk management education initiative.  The project objective is to conduct research to gain
a greater understanding of farmer risk management decision making and educational needs.  The
survey was conducted in four states: Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska.  Two major crops
were chosen for particular emphasis in each state.  The crop emphasis in each state is as follows:
corn and soybeans in Indiana and Nebraska; cotton and soybeans in Mississippi; and cotton and
grain sorghum in Texas.  
Each state’s Agricultural Statistical Service was contracted to sample from their pool of
commercial farms.   After excluding small noncommercial farms generating less than $25,000 in
gross income, the sample was stratified across four categories of gross farm income.  Mail surveys
were sent to crop producers prior to planting in the spring of 1999.  A follow-up reminder card
was sent two weeks following the first mailing and a second mailing was sent to those who had
not returned a survey two weeks after the postcard reminder.  A total of 1,812 questionnaires
were returned for a response rate of 26.6 percent.  After elimination of non-responses to5
particular questions used in this analysis, 1350 useable responses were included in this analysis. 
Producers were asked to make a comparison between two policy alternatives and to state their
preference for one versus the other.  Five possible responses were allowed: Strongly Agree,
Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, or Not Sure.  Questions were posed in a direct comparison
form to force the producer to evaluate which program they prefer.   In this analysis, the responses
are collapsed into a binary choice framework.  Responses of either strongly agree or agree are
treated as a positive response to a particular policy, while responses of disagree, strongly
disagree, and not sure are treated as a non-positive response. This approach does not fully reflect
the diversity of responses which might be captured with a multinomial model.  However, this
approach allows for a simplicity of interpretation that is confounded by more complex models.
Policy Choices Examined
Producers were asked for their preference between transition payments and the deficiency
payment program.  Specifically they were asked for their agreement or disagreement with the
statement, “eliminate transition payments and go back to deficiency payments.”  This question
elicited producers’ preference for the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act versus the deficiency payment
program, which had existed for many years prior to 1996.   
Producers were also asked for their agreement or disagreement with the statement,
“Subsidy should be increased on higher crop insurance coverages, rather than increasing the level
of catastrophic coverage.”   This question is relevant to the ongoing Congressional debate about
reforming crop insurance.  Current legislation provides free catastrophic coverage insurance,
which provides a 50 percent yield guarantee indemnified at 55 percent of expected price. 
Subsidies for higher crop insurance coverage options are keyed off the value of the catastrophic6
coverage policy.  However, the percent subsidy on higher levels of coverage declines from the
100 percent subsidy on a catastrophic policy.  A key provision of many crop insurance reform bills
is increasing the benefits of the program, either through higher subsidies on buy-up coverage or
through increased catastrophic coverage levels. 
Producers were also asked for their agreement or disagree with the statement, "Raise loan
rates, rather than increase crop insurance funding."   Much of the decline in farm market income
since 1997 has resulted from price declines resulting from weakened export markets.  The 1996
farm bill left the marketing loan program intact, but capped at 1995 levels.  Thus, this question
elicits the producer’s preferences for price support through higher marketing loan rates versus
increased insurance subsidies.  
Producers were also asked for their agreement or disagreement with the statement,
"Provide insurance premium subsidies, rather than make disaster payments."  This question
elicited producer preferences for receiving risk protection in the form of insurance subsidized at a
higher level rather than disaster payments, which have traditionally been offered after the disaster
event and on an ad hoc basis.  Producers in all four states are assumed familiar with the choices,
given that ad hoc disaster payments were made in 1998.  Further, the disaster payments of 1998
included increased insurance premium subsidies for producers, so producers should have been
aware of additional insurance premium subsidies. 
Model
Producers are assumed to maximize expected utility according to a von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function defined over wealth (W).  When confronted with a choice between
two alternative farm policies, the i'th producer compares expected utility with the first farm policy7
EU1i(W) to expected utility with the second farm policy EU2i(W).  While direct measurements of
producers' perceptions and risk attitudes are not available, observable measures can be obtained
for factors that influence the distribution and expected utility evaluation of wealth (Maddala). 
These factors are used as a vector, X, of attributes of the choices made by individual i and 0i is a
random disturbance that arises from unobserved variation in preferences, attributes of the
alternatives, and errors in optimization.  Following customary discrete choice analysis, we limit
the amount of nonlinearity in the likelihood function by assuming that EU1i(W) and EU2i(W) may
be written:
(1) EU1i(W) = ￿1UXi + 01i  
(2) EU2i(W) = ￿2UXi + 02i .
The difference in expected utility may then be written:
(3) EU1i(W) - EU2i(W) = (￿1UXi + 01i) - (￿2UXi + 02i)
       = (￿1U - ￿2U) Xi + (01i - 02i)
     = ￿U Xi + ￿i
where ￿U = (￿1U- ￿2U) and ￿i = (01i - 02i).  A preference for the first policy will result if EU1i(W) -
EU2i(W) > 0;  whereas, a preference for the second policy will be revealed if EU1i(W) - EU2i(W)
< 0.   
This binary choice framework is consistent with econometric estimation techniques such
as logit and probit.  In this analysis, we use logit models which provide estimates of the
probability that an individual prefers policy alternative one.  The probability from the logit model
may be written:8












where, following Greene, the notation ￿(￿’X) represents the logisitic cumulative distribution
function.   
Data
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables involved
in this analysis.  First, the dependent dummy variables are examined.  Fifty-six percent of the
sample indicated that they would prefer to go back to the deficiency payment program.  The
second dependent variable, indicating a preference for increased insurance subsidies over
increased catastrophic coverage, is shown to be preferred by 53 percent of the survey
respondents.  Of the four dependent variables, the lowest level of agreement, 42 percent,  was
indicated for the question asking a preference for increased loan rates rather than increased
insurance subsidies.  Finally, the fourth dependent variable represents a trade off between
increased funding for insurance programs versus disaster programs. Fifty-four percent of those
responding indicated that they would prefer insurance programs to the disaster program.  
The remaining variables in Table 1 are independent explanatory variables for the analysis. 
An indicator of farm size is measured as the total crop acres in the farming operation.  Farm size
is meant to reflect differences in scale of operation.  Among the survey respondents, the mean
total crop acres is slightly more than 1,400 acres in the farming operation.  The maximum size
was 18,000 acres of cropland. 
The next four variables in Table 1 indicate the percent of total acres planted to a specific9
crop.  The four crops examined are the four primary crops analyzed in the survey (corn, soybeans,
cotton, and sorghum).   It is hypothesized that potential differences in the economic context of
producing different crops may influence policy preferences.  For example, cotton tends to be a
high-input cost crop as compared to soybean production.  Given that many producers produce
only a subset of the crops included in this list and would have a zero value in an instance where
they did not produce the crop, the mean values for the percent of crop acres planted to a
particular crop on average are relatively low.  Of the four crops, soybeans have the highest mean
percentage value of approximately 28 percent.  Sorghum, which is only analyzed in one state, has
the lowest mean value for this variable of three percent.  Examining the range these variables take
reveals there were some farms that had a maximum value near 100 percent.  This indicates that
there were some farms included in the analysis which were highly specialized.
The next two variables are derived from questions asking the perceived potential for yield
and price variability to affect farm income.  In the survey instrument, producers were asked to
evaluate these risks on a five-point scale as to the potential effect of particular risks on that
individual’s farm income.  A value of five on the scale represented a high potential to affect farm
income.  If the survey respondent indicated a value of  five, they were identified with a dummy
variable.  The mean values for price and yield variability are both relatively high with slightly more
than 44 percent of respondents indicating that yield variability had a high potential to affect their
farm income and 69 percent of respondents indicating the price variability had that potential.  
A negative correlation between market price and farm yield may influence the overall risk
environment of a firm.  There is evidence suggesting that negative correlation may exist in some
crops and regions (Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes, and Heifner and Coble ).  Survey respondents10
were asked if they perceived a negative correlation between their farm yield and price through a
hypothetical scenario where their farm yield fell 30 percent below average.  They were then asked
to indicate whether they would expect prices to increase or decrease, or their expectations would
remain unchanged given this yield shock.  Individuals responding that they would expect an
increase in market price if their yield was 30 percent below average are indicated by a dummy
variable.  If the respondent perceived that a 30 percent shortfall in their yield would not change
their price expectation, or that they would perceive that price would be below expectation, the
dummy variable was given a value of zero. The table shows 28 percent of the respondents
perceived that there was a negative correlation between their yield and the market price.
The next variable included in the analysis is described as a willingness to accept a lower
price to avoid risk.  This question, although couched in terms of price risk, is indicative of
whether the individual behaves in a manner consistent with risk aversion as suggested by expected
utility theory.  A risk averse individual would be willing to forego income to avoid risk.  This
question was also asked on a five-point agree/disagree scale.  Individuals indicating that  they
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they were willing to accept a lower price to
avoid risk received a value of one in the construction of this dummy variable.  Of the respondents,
33 percent indicated that they had a willingness to accept a lower price to avoid risk.  
The next variable was derived from a question asking whether the producer’s farm income
in 1998 was below the average of the preceding five years.  This variable was included to indicate
whether the producer had recently suffered a farm income loss, such that they might be more
sensitive or vulnerable to risks in the current year.  Summary statistics show that 65 percent of the
respondents indicated they had a below average income year in 1998.  11
One of the commonly recognized approaches to limiting farm risk is the augmentation of
the farm family’s income with off-farm earnings.  This has the potential both to raise household
income and diversify income sources for the household away from the production agriculture
sector.  Survey respondents were asked what percent of their household gross farm income came
from farming.  This percentage can take a value up to 100 percent.  The average value indicated
by producers is 73.5 percent, with a range from two to 100 percent.
Percent of total farm investments that are borrowed is also included.  This measures an
important aspect of financial risk.  This information is hypothesized to be an important component
of characterizing the risk decision making environment for the farm.  Among the survey
respondents, the mean value was 31.8 percent. 
The college education variable indicates whether the respondent had completed at least a
four-year college degree.  The results indicate that 36 percent of the individuals responding to the
survey had completed a four-year college degree.    
The next variable identifies farmers who perceive government program risk as having
significant potential to affect their farm income.  This variable was also measured on a five-point
scale with a value of five indicating that government program changes had a strong potential to
affect farm income and a low value on the five point scale indicating that they perceive potential
government program changes as a low risk to their farm income.  Construction of a dummy
variable was carried out by giving a positive value to the dummy variable if the individual
indicated that government program risk merited either a four or five on the five-point scale. In the
sample, the variable took a positive value for 64 percent of the respondents.  
Participation in buy-up crop insurance is included in the models involving changing crop12
insurance policies.  The purchase of buy-up crop insurance is indicated by a  dummy variable,
which takes a value of one if the individual purchased some form of buy-up crop insurance in
1998.  Fifty-three percent of the individuals in the survey sample indicated that they bought some
form of buy-up crop insurance.  This variable takes a value of zero for all individuals who did not
purchase crop insurance or only purchased the catastrophic coverage policy.  
Results
In this section we report the logit model results predicting producer preferences for each
of the four dichotomous policy choices posed.  Likelihood ratio test chi-squared statistics for each
of the models are reported and all models are strongly significant.  A second measure of model
performance, percent concordant, gives the percent of observations where the predicted
probability and observed response agree.  The models all had a percent concordance of at least
60.1 percent. 
Prefer to go Back to Deficiency Payment Program
The analysis of preferences between the current farm policy and deficiency payments are
reported in Table 2.  The results indicate several significant economic factors influencing this
preference.  
Two of the four variables indicating the percent of crop acres planted to a specific crop
are significant.  These are the percentages of crop acres planted to corn and cotton.  Opposing
signs indicate that as the percent corn increases the producer is significantly less likely to prefer a
return to deficiency payments while cotton producers tend to have a preference for going back to
the deficiency payment program.  Given that support for Freedom to Farm was strong in the
Cornbelt and that Southern legislators tended to be less supportive of enacting Freedom to Farm,  13
the underlying perceptions of Freedom to Farm appear to still exist.  Thus, of the four crops
examined in this analysis, cotton producers would have the strongest propensity to return to the
deficiency payment program.  
Interestingly, of the yield and price risk variables, yield variability  is significant and
negative in the deficiency payment model.  This suggests that producers who perceive yield
variability as having a high potential to affect their farm income are less desirous of a return to the
deficiency payment program.  We would interpret this result as indicating that a return to the
price-support-oriented deficiency payment program is less attractive to producers who view yield
variability as a major source of risk in their farm businesses. 
The next significant variable in the model was the variable indicating whether 1998 income
was below the five-year average.  This dummy variable is significant and positive in sign,
indicating that those individuals who incurred a below average income in the previous year are
more inclined to return to the deficiency payment program.  Given that deficiency payment
programs had a risk mitigating effect, and in particular, provided price risk protection, this result
suggests that individuals who had recently incurred a below average income year perceive that the
previous farm legislation would have provided greater protection.    
College education is significant and negative suggesting that individuals who have a
college degree are significantly less likely to prefer a return to the deficiency payment program
over current farm policy.  
The final significant variable in the model is the variable indicating whether the respondent
perceives that changes in government farm policy represent a risk that has a high potential to
affect farm income. Our results show that this variable has a positive effect on the preference to14
go back to deficiency payments.
Prefer More Insurance Subsidy to Increased Catastrophic Coverage
Table 3 provides results from the model explaining the characteristics of individuals who
prefer more insurance subsidies to an increase in catastrophic coverage insurance.
The total crop acres variable is significant and positive. This indicates that larger
operations tend to prefer increased insurance subsidies relative to catastrophic coverage.  Of the
four commodity percentage variables, two crops, corn and cotton, are significant.  As in the
previous model they take opposite signs.  This result  indicates that individuals with a higher
percentage of corn in their crop mix are less likely to prefer increased insurance subsidies over
increased catastrophic coverage.  Conversely, producers with a higher percent of cotton in their
crop mix are more desirous of an increase in insurance subsidies.
Price variability is negative and significant in this model, indicating that individuals who
perceive high price variability are less likely to prefer increases in an insurance subsidy, rather than
increases in catastrophic coverage levels. 
The next significant variable in this model is the willingness to accept a lower price to
avoid risk.  Risk aversion, as captured by this variable, has a negative effect on the preference
between insurance subsidy and increased catastrophic coverage.  This indicates that producers
who are more risk averse are less willing to take the insurance subsidy and would prefer to see an
increase in catastrophic coverage. 
The percent of total farm investment that is borrowed takes a significant positive value.
Thus, farms that are more highly leveraged would like to see more insurance subsidies relative to
an increase in catastrophic coverage.  College education takes a positive and significant sign,15
indicating that individuals with a four-year college degree are more desirous of seeing increased
insurance subsidies relative to increases in catastrophic coverage.  Also, significant in this model is
the variable indicating purchase of buy-up insurance in 1998.  The results suggest that individuals
who purchase insurance are more likely to prefer insurance subsidies over catastrophic coverage.  
Prefer Increased Loan Rates to Increased Insurance Subsidy
Table 4 reports results of the model of preference between loan rate increases and an
increase in the insurance subsidy.  Total crop acres has a significant and positive effect on the
preference for increased loan rates.  Only one of the crop percentage variables is significant.  It is
the percentage of crop acres planted to sorghum, which has a negative effect on the probability of
preferring higher loan rates to increased insurance subsidies.  This is consistent with sorghum
producers being more desirous of increased subsidies on their crop insurance and perceiving less
value in an enhanced the price safety net for their commodity.  
Price variability as perceived by the producer is significant and has a positive effect on the
probability of preferring a loan rate.  This indicates that respondents who perceive price risk as
being a major risk tend to prefer direct price support rather than support through insurance.
The variable indicating that 1998 income was below the five-year average is also
significant in this model and takes a positive sign, as it did in the model analyzing preferences for
deficiency payment programs.  Producers who incurred a below average income in 1998 are more
likely to prefer a loan rate to an increase in insurance subsidies.  This is consistent with individuals
who had a below average year in 1998 due to a low price perceiving a need for a price floor
relative to an increase in insurance subsidies.  
In this choice, producers who had a higher percent of gross income from farming indicate16
a significantly higher probability of preferring higher loan rates.  College education is also
significant, but takes a negative sign.  This suggests that individuals with a college education are
less likely to prefer an increase in loan rates to an increase in insurance subsidies. 
The perception of government programs affecting risk is positively associated with a
preference for loan rate increases.  Conversely, previous crop insurance participation is negatively
related to a preference for increased loan rates.  
Prefer Insurance to Disaster Programs
The final model estimated is reported in Table 5.  This analysis examined the preference
for insurance premium subsidies rather than disaster payments.  Two of the crop percentage
variables are significant.  Both variables have a positive effect on the probability of preferring an
insurance premium subsidy.  This suggests that corn and soybean producers tend to be more
favorably inclined to insurance subsidy as compared to disaster payments.  
Yield variability is also significant in this model.  Producers who perceive yield variability
as having a high potential effect on farm income are significantly more likely to prefer increased
insurance subsidies even though both forms of support mitigate yield losses.  This is consistent
with individuals who would incur higher premium rates preferring more subsidy.  However, these
individuals would also tend to have higher payouts from a disaster program as well.  We interpret
this result as indicating the high yield risk farms perceive a greater value in statutory premium
subsidies as compared to the more unpredictable passage of ad hoc disaster legislation.
Perception of a negative correlation between price and yield is shown to have a  significant
effect on the probability of  preferring insurance subsidy over disaster funding.   In this case,
producers who perceive a negative yield-price correlation may perceive a greater benefit from17
revenue insurance than from a purely yield triggered disaster program.  A negative yield-price
correlation would create a situation where revenue insurance is a relatively cheap and effective
protection as compared to protecting yield and price separately.   
The next significant variable in the model is the risk aversion variable.  Those who reveal
risk aversion are significantly more likely to prefer insurance subsidies over disaster payments. 
This result suggests that risk averse producers perceive greater protection from crop insurance
than from ad hoc disaster legislation which is generally not enacted until a disaster has occurred.  
Percent of household income from farming is positive and significant in this model,
indicating that farms earning a greater percentage of household income from farming have a
greater probability of preferring increased insurance premium subsidies.  College education also
has a significant and positive effect.  The final variable in the model is the dummy indicator of
whether the respondent has purchased buy up crop insurance.  As hypothesized, those who have
previously purchased insurance reveal that they find crop insurance beneficial and are found to be
significantly more likely to prefer insurance subsidy.    
Conclusions and Interpretation
The results from the four models indicate several significant relationships between
economic variables and farm policy preferences.  While it is intuitive that policy preferences are
related to the economic context of the producer, these results provide significant insights into why
consensus policy is difficult to achieve.  
Farm size is significant and positive in two of the four models.  Given the economies of
scale in agricultural production and the imposition of payment limitations on some government
programs, this is not surprising.  Farms with more crop acres are found to prefer more insurance18
subsidy to increased catastrophic coverage and reveal they prefer increased loan rates to more
insurance subsidy.   This suggests larger farms find relatively little value in low level insurance
coverage and have a strong desire for the price guarantee of loan rates.  
Examination of the percent crop acres variables revealed that each of the crops was
significant in at least one model.  The most intriguing general finding is the opposite signs taken
by percent corn acres and percent cotton acres.  Cotton producers are significantly more likely to
prefer a return to deficiency payments and prefer increased insurance subsidy over catastrophic
coverage.   The percent acres planted to corn takes the opposite sign in both models.  This
dichotomy suggests that the economics of these two crops are sufficiently distinct to lead to
strongly divergent policy preferences.  We surmise that this divergence of policy preference stems
in part from differences in producers’ views of the U.S. markets.  U.S. cotton has many world
competitors and a relatively small share of world exports.  Cotton producers are likely to desire
the protection of deficiency programs in spite of the distortionary trade effects.  Conversely, U.S.
corn is a large share of world corn exports and past experience with deficiency payments and the
associated set-asides may be perceived as harmful to remaining competitive in world markets.        
  The three variables characterizing the components of revenue variability, price risk, yield
risk, and yield-price correlation are each significant in some models.   Producers perceiving yield
variability as having a significant potential to affect them have a lower probability of preferring a
return to deficiency payments and are more likely to prefer insurance subsidy to disaster
payments.  This is consistent with wanting relatively more government funding devoted to higher
insurance protection and relatively less to price protection programs.  
Those perceiving a high degree of price risk are less likely to prefer insurance subsidy over19
catastrophic coverage and have a higher probability of preferring increased loan rates to insurance
subsidy.  Given that this variable is not significant in the “return to deficiency payments” question,
those perceiving price risk as important may be indicating a lesser desire for increased insurance
funding and a desire for price protection through higher loan rates.   The correlation variable is
found to have a positive effect on the probability of preferring insurance to disaster programs.  A
factor here may be the introduction of revenue insurance, individuals perceiving negative
correlation in price and yields might be expected to prefer revenue insurance which implicitly
recognizes correlation of price and yield.       
Risk aversion has a significant positive effect on the preference for increased subsidy over
increased catastrophic coverage and the preference for insurance over disaster programs.  This
suggests that risk aversion is positively related to a preference for the high levels of protection
afforded by buy-up insurance coverage versus the low level of yield protection afforded by either
catastrophic coverage or disaster programs.  
Producers who incurred a below average farm income in 1998 might be expected to desire
greater government support.  Given that the questions posed require a preference between
alternative policies it was found that this variable is positively related to a desire for traditional
farm policy mechanisms.  Below average income is positively associated with a desired return to
deficiency payments and  increased loan rates over insurance subsidy.  It is negatively related to a
preference for insurance over disaster programs.   Thus, this group appears least in favor of the
policy trends toward Freedom to Farm and expanding crop insurance programs.  Conversely, the
college education variable is the only variable significant in all four models and is positively
associated with the policy trends of the 1990s --toward Freedom to Farm and expanding crop20
insurance programs.  
Not surprisingly, producers who perceive government programs having a high potential to
affect income are inclined to prefer a return to past policies.  This variable was positively related
to a preference for a return to deficiency payments and increased loan rates over insurance
subsidy.  Finally, the purchase of buy-up insurance is consistently related to a preference for
increased insurance subsidy rather than increased loan rates, disaster programs, or increased
catastrophic coverage.  This suggests that those who have participated in buy-up insurance tend
to find it useful, and would like to see additional government resources devoted to it.   
    This study provides an insight into producer policy preferences at a time when much
attention is being given to farm policy issues.  It is also unique in that producers from four diverse
regions and crops are included.  This allowed examination of the diversity of preferences that
smaller single-state studies have not allowed.  Given the current debate over farm policy it reveals
some of the economic forces underlying preferences.  These findings add to our understanding of
why producers of different regions and commodities are not always in agreement regarding
preferred policy.  A recognition of the underlying economic factors influencing farm policy
preferences may provide guidance to finding resolution.  While, it is common for political leaders
and various interest groups to be well versed in the economics situation of their constituents, this
analysis gives perspective across regions and commodities that is seldom available.
Natural extension of this work would investigate producers of other commodities or from
other regions.  Further, a more refined approach to examining this data may be undertaken using
multinomial logit models. 22
Table 1.
Variable Mean Std, Dev. Min. Max.
Prefer to Go Back to the Deficiency Payment Program 0.56 0.50 0 1.00
Prefer More Insurance Subsidy to Increased Catastrophic Coverage 0.53 0.50 0 1.00
Prefer Increased Loan Rates to Increased Insurance Subsidy 0.42 0.49 0 1.00
Prefer Insurance Premium Subsidy to Disaster Payments 0.54 0.50 0 1.00
Total Crop Acres 1440.38 1572.72 46 18000
Percent of total acres planted to corn 0.24 0.23 0 0.97
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans 0.28 0.27 0 0.96
Percent of total acres planted to cotton 0.14 0.25 0 0.99
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum 0.03 0.11 0 0.98
Yield Variability Perceived as a High Potential to Affect Farm Income 0.44 0.49 0 1.00
Price Variability Perceived as a High Potential to Affect Farm Income 0.69 0.46 0 1.00
Perceives a Negative Correlation Between Farm Yield and Price  0.28 0.45 0 1.00
Willing To Accept a Lower Price to Avoid Risk 0.33 0.47 0 1.00
1998 Income was Below 5-year Average 0.65 0.48 0 1.00
Percent of Household Gross Income from Farming 73.53 27.62 2 100
Percent of Total Farm Investment that are Borrowed 31.86 28.25 0 99
College Education 0.36 0.48 0 1.00
Government Programs Perceived as Having a High Potential to Affect Farm Income 0.64 0.48 0 1.00
Purchased Buy Up Crop Insurance  0.53 0.50 0 1.0023
Table 2.




Total crop acres (100s) -0.003 0.3856
Percent of total acres planted to corn -0.5566 0.0866
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans -0.1927 0.4481
Percent of total acres planted to cotton 1.2996 0.0001
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum -0.3431 0.5569
Yield variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
-0.2299 0.0769
Price variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
0.0901 0.519
Perceive a negative correlation between farm yield
and price
-0.1159 0.4575
Willing accept a lower price to avoid risk 0.0612 0.6146
1998 income was below 5-year average 0.3211 0.0082
Percent of household gross income from farming -0.00218 0.3139
Percent of total farm investment that are borrowed 0.0027 0.1971
College Education -0.4217 0.0007
Government programs perceived as having a high
potential to affect farm income
0.4276 0.0007








Total crop acres (100s) 0.007 0.0867
Percent of total acres planted to corn -0.659 0.048
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans 0.2276 0.3608
Percent of total acres planted to cotton 0.5596 0.0585
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum 0.2989 0.6192
Yield variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
0.3547 0.1641
Price variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
-0.5323 0.0924
Perceive a negative correlation between farm yield
and price
0.1106 0.4849
Willing accept a lower price to avoid risk 0.3772 0.0023
1998 income was below 5-year average -0.1083 0.3791
Percent of household gross income from farming -0.00038 0.8629
Percent of total farm investment that are borrowed 0.00546 0.0109
College Education 0.2404 0.0554
Government programs perceived as having a high
potential to affect farm income
--- ---








Total crop acres (100s) 0.008 0.0521
Percent of total acres planted to corn 0.2965 0.3561
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans 0.0636 0.7937
Percent of total acres planted to cotton 0.3995 0.1688
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum -0.9925 0.0909
Yield variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
-0.3643 0.1454
Price variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
0.5636 0.0639
Perceive a negative correlation between farm yield
and price
-0.2024 0.1817
Willing accept a lower price to avoid risk 0.1446 0.2311
1998 income was below 5-year average 0.223 0.0586
Percent of household gross income from farming 0.00426 0.0457
Percent of total farm investment that are borrowed -0.00019 0.9282
College Education -0.2956 0.0146
Government programs perceived as having a high
potential to affect farm income
0.2782 0.0251




Prefer Insurance to Disaster Programs
Parameter p-value
Intercept -2.0691 0.0001
Total crop acres (100s) -0.002 0.5851
Percent of total acres planted to corn 0.6284 0.0509
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans 0.5679 0.0315
Percent of total acres planted to cotton 0.1754 0.5481
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum -0.1647 0.7837
Yield variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
0.582 0.0246
Price variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
0.2227 0.4919
Perceive a negative correlation between farm yield
and price
0.3787 0.0016
Willing accept a lower price to avoid risk 0.2464 0.0949
1998 income was below 5-year average -0.1978 0.0954
Percent of household gross income from farming 0.00405 0.0609
Percent of total farm investment that are borrowed 0.00236 0.2574
College Education 0.2483 0.0404
Government programs perceived as having a high
potential to affect farm income
--- ---
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